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Editorial

WE are happy to salute the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, our venerable mother, on the two hundred and fiftieth anniversary of her birth. We are happy, too, to mark the occasion with an article by Dr Lowther Clarke, whom we are accustomed to regard as the G.O.M. of the S.P.C.K. And there is another G.O.M. whom we are in special duty bound to call to mind this month. May 19 will be the fiftieth anniversary of the death of Mr Gladstone. There will always be difference of opinion about his policies, though hardly about his eminence, as a Christian statesman. Dr Döllinger placed him in the front rank of British theologians, and his place there might have been obvious and secure if he had been free to consecrate his gifts without distraction to theology. About one thing, however, there can be no doubt, as we have reason to know better than anyone. In founding St Deiniol's Library for the pursuit of divine learning, Mr Gladstone bequeathed to posterity a treasure that will prove more and more valuable as time goes on. At all events, for the last ten years it has provided an ideal base for the editorial work of THEOLOGY.

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British theology has put a characteristic, and perhaps its best, foot forward in Dr D. M. Baillie's book *God was in Christ: An Essay on Incarnation and Atonement* (Faber and Faber, 16s.). There is not here (except in the exquisite last chapter) the same charm of style and beauty of composition as we have come to associate with the work of his brother, Dr John Baillie, who is better known south of the border. But there is the same level-headedness, penetrating judgment and power of constructive thought. At any time this would have been a notable contribution to Christology, and it is particularly apt to the present time.

Dr Baillie points out that the quest for "the Jesus of history" has not only been abandoned by many contemporary theologians, especially on the Continent, but is now being pronounced both mistaken in intention and impossible of attainment. It is well that this reaction or swing of the pendulum should be examined. Dr Baillie is sympathetic with its motives, and is very far from wishing to reinstate a reduced or humanitarian Christology. But he is apprehensive lest the insights of the last generation, because of their one-sidedness, should be light-heartedly rejected by this generation. Here as elsewhere he is rightly suspicious of those who press one side of the truth to its logical conclusion, so negating other sides. His argument that there can be no tolerable resting-place in a combination of high Christology

with radical scepticism about the Jesus of history is one that will receive wide assent among British theologians. No one so far has worked it out so carefully.

But Dr Baillie writes with "the typical modern man" in view as well as the theologian. While theologians now seem willing to sacrifice the Jesus of history to a high Christology, the lay mind for the most part does not see why any Christology at all is necessary. "To theologians the question may seem so naïve and so outmoded as to be hardly worthy of attention in a theological book. But theologians are apt to be deaf to the questionings of the outside world. And in that outside world at the present time I am persuaded that there is a very large number of thinking people who, while deeply impressed and even captivated by the human figure of the historical Jesus, are completely mystified by the doctrine of the Incarnation and by what may be called 'the return to Christology' among theologians."

In inquiring how men may be brought to see the living interest in the doctrine of the Incarnation, Dr Baillie is led to suggest that the best approach is to show how Christology illuminates the nature of God and the meaning of history. Then, after criticizing some recent Christological theories, including the Kenotic theory, he comes to his central chapter, which is entitled "The Paradox of the Incarnation." This begins with the surprising, but perhaps just, observation that modern Anglican theology has tended to be intolerant of paradox until it comes to the doctrine of the Incarnation, when it becomes quite different, treating the *mysterium Christi* as a solitary exception. Dr Baillie, on the other hand, maintains that by reflection upon the mystery of grace and freedom in Christian experience we can be taken nearer than in any other way to see how our Lord is both completely divine and completely human.

There is here a really fresh contribution to Christological thought, and the same can be said of the following chapters, which relate the doctrine of the Incarnation to the doctrine of the Trinity and of the Atonement. This is a book which may not be of direct use to the lay outsider, but it should be of great use to theologians and preachers both in thinking these doctrines out for themselves and in communicating their meaning to inquirers. Again and again Dr Baillie says something of which one is moved to say: "I wish he would develop that further." And that, we suppose, is one of the marks of a good theological book.

Two Hundred and Fifty Years of S.P.C.K.

THE 250th anniversary of a Church Society deserves to be recorded, for, apart from any merits of the S.P.C.K., in these days of shifting landmarks we are grateful to find proofs of permanence in our institutions. The Society's history is not so universally known as to dispense with the need of repeating a few facts. It was essentially a seventeenth-century creation, arising out of the Religious Societies which flourished towards the end of the century, on parochial lines. When Dr Bray and four laymen met on March 8, 1698 (Old Style), they formed another such Society with the single difference of its being non-parochial. On that memorable day they resolved to consider how to promote the erection of Catechetical Schools in each parish in and about London; took steps to further the teaching of the Church Catechism; and asked Dr Bray to submit his scheme for promoting religion in the plantations. At the second meeting, on March 10, the first publication was approved, the members subscribing £12 to pay for the printing.

The original idea of S.P.C.K.'s being a foreign missionary society was abandoned in favour of the foundation of a new Society, which should have a Royal Charter. The S.P.G., founded in 1701, was to be the official body, S.P.C.K. remaining a free-lance. When in 1825 the Indian Mission, which had fallen to S.P.C.K. because S.P.G. in the early eighteenth century was confined by its charter to English colonies, was handed over to S.P.G., the Society's annual report said: "A Chartered Body . . . gives a pledge for continued good management, which no voluntary association can offer."

This, then, was from the first the special mark of S.P.C.K., that, consistently with its Anglican principles, it was free to do anything. Probably a similar idea to that expressed in 1825, that Church education needed an official body, led to the foundation of the National Society, inaugurated in 1811 at a meeting of S.P.C.K. members held at the Society's house, after which S.P.C.K. charity schools became a thing of the past.

Some 125 years had passed, half the present life of the Society. Its activities had been on a small scale, but important enough to attract the historian. "The most important and lasting impression of the religious revival was made by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. . . . The diffusion of Bibles and of other religious literature was their chief object. . . . A supply of Bibles and other books to America was begun on a large scale, and to the rest of the world on a scale, modest indeed as compared to the gigantic work of the Society in later years, but ever growing with the growing power and wealth of England overseas" (G. M. Trevelyan, *English Social History*, p. 329).

With the loss of foreign missions and charity schools the Society was left with publishing and bookselling as its main work, though during the nineteenth century many other activities were added, financed largely by the profits of the bookselling. These naturally fluctuated, and to maintain its missionary grants the Society had to appeal energetically for subscriptions and Church collections. The problem of management

was at times acute as the business side developed, for a committee of clergymen and missionary-minded laymen had no obvious qualifications to be directors of a publishing concern and were very dependent on the skill of their officers.

The work of the Society today probably suffers from too wide a dissipation of effort, but its present leaders are aware of the danger. If recent output of important books has not been very impressive, the cause, apart from the factors that affect all publishers, is wholly creditable. At all costs the Society has striven to keep those sides of the work going which without it would go by default or largely so, especially religious and educational books for the mission field, with the result that printing facilities and paper for competitive publishing at home have been sadly lacking. Africa alone could have absorbed all the paper available. So long as paper is allotted in terms of a proportion of that used in 1938-39, no publisher is allowed to expand, however promising his ideas. But the curious situation has arisen that publishing, in one sense never more beset with difficulties, in another has never been easier; if MSS are wisely chosen, books sell themselves, and advertising is undertaken to enable booksellers to sell their stocks (and incidentally to please authors) rather than because it is necessary for the publisher.

Where S.P.C.K. has made great advances in the last few years is in the multiplication of bookshops under its own management, in every case with the approval of the diocesan authorities. The new shops must be expected to have their growing pains, but the policy has been abundantly justified by the increased sales of religious books in towns where a shop has been opened. The similar work overseas is less familiar. Thus in Burma, Irak and Tanganyika the trade in English books is practically all in the hands of the Society. In the present state of the world this forward policy involves constant anxiety and many risks. One thing the outside observer might not think of is the necessity of expansion if the Church was to be properly served. The economic unit for efficiency is much larger than it was. In particular, publishing depends greatly on the ability of a firm's staff, and before the recent expansion S.P.C.K. was too small to provide openings for competent young men.

Stress has been laid on the books side of the Society, for it is this that is making a unique contribution to the Church's life, whereas in other departments its work is in the main ancillary to that of other bodies.

The present commemoration is an opportunity for considering the future of voluntary societies in the Church of England and their relation to the central organization. They fall into three classes: (*a*) Those with a special aim, which it is hard to see integrated with the Church House; (*b*) missionary societies; (*c*) others whose functions do in a measure overlap with official activities.

(*a*) Organizations like the Church Army, Mothers' Union, or Church of England Children's Society could not be made official, so far as one can see.

(*b*) The missionary enterprise of the Church of England is conducted in a unique way. In the American Episcopal Church, for example, an

assessment for missions is made by headquarters on the diocese, which apportions it among the parishes. Canada has a similar method, I believe. The Church of Scotland has its Department of Foreign Missions. The English Free Churches have their Missionary Societies, each representing its Church. At Edinburgh House (Conference of British Missionary Societies) the societies have a membership reckoned according to the income from voluntary contributions. The Church of England as such is not represented except for the Missionary Council of the Church Assembly, which is far outnumbered by the Anglican societies. So the curious situation is found that the Baptist Missionary Society, for example, speaks for the Baptists, but no one for the Church of England. This might seem a devastating criticism of our methods, but in practice no harm seems to ensue, and Edinburgh House is becoming a more important centre of Anglican activities than the Missionary Council. One reason for this is the attitude of Government Departments, which often insist on dealing with non-Roman missions as a whole. Probably we are further than ever away from realizing any hope that may have been cherished of the Church's becoming its "own Missionary Society." If it did, a falling off in the present zeal of missionary supporters would probably result. But we cannot conceive of the disappearance of the C.M.S. for one, and certain small missions, like those of Kelham and Mirfield in South Africa, are outstanding for the economy and efficiency with which they are conducted. Undoubtedly the present system is costly to administer, but a unified one based on the Church House would probably be equally so.

(*c*) There are certain societies which have played too large a part in Church life to be safely allowed to go their own way, at least so it might be argued. Notably the National Society and the S.P.C.K. The former, as a society, is now only a shadow of its former self. By accepting a large Church Assembly representation and substantial Assembly grants it has made this inevitable. A matter like Church Schools, involving negotiations with the Government, could not have been left to a voluntary society, however venerable its tradition, and the policy was doubtless right. Further, as religious education is organized on a diocesan basis it needs an official centre for policy.

The S.P.C.K. remains for consideration. Clearly it differs widely from the National Society. For one thing it deviated from S.P.G. and the latter Society precisely on the ground of not being official. The case for retaining independence is strong. Survival for 250 years may fairly be taken as a sign that God has blessed it.

Publishing is a profession that demands independence. The cause of culture is best served by many minds working at the problems and by the fullest representation of minorities. Even in Anglican publishing S.P.C.K. will always be a minority. Most established authors prefer a general publisher in the belief, not always well founded, that they reach the outside public better than under a religious imprint. And to the end of the chapter S.P.C.K. will be too much handicapped by the necessity of producing tracts and pamphlets (commercially unprofitable because of the cost of handling), and of accepting books which no one else will take, to be in any danger of undue success.

The ideal seems to be that S.P.C.K. should continue to develop along two lines. First, as an independent publisher with a mind of its own, though always deferring to the weight of its tradition, the views of its members, and episcopal authority as defined by its rules. It may be added that successive Archbishops of Canterbury have informally given great help to the Society by their advice and friendly interest.

Secondly, the business side of the Society functions efficiently on purely business lines, largely conditioned by the policy laid down by the trade organizations of which it is a member. Common sense dictates that this organization, which is at the service of the Church of England, should be fully used. As conditions improve, by its distributing facilities the Society could readily render valuable service in connection with the arts of the Church and what are known as "visual aids" as well as by printing and publishing. It has already been entrusted with the executive work of producing films for the Church of England.

W. K. Lowther Clarke.

The Hebrew Word "Shaliach"

Of all the books hitherto issued with the forthcoming Lambeth Conference in view, the largest so far is the now familiar volume, *The Apostolic Ministry*, edited by Dr K. E. Kirk, the Bishop of Oxford. The ten essays of which the book consists go again over ground explored so many times before that the learned writers have been able to discover little that is new. At first sight an exception appears in Dom Gregory Dix's discovery of what he calls "a well-known Jewish institution of which our Lord made use in the foundation of His Church." What "institution" is this?

The Greek word *apostolos*, Dom Gregory Dix says, is "the mere translation" of a Hebrew word *shaliach*, which occurs in the Mishnah and the Talmud. Very well, the Greek word means "*one sent forth*" and the Hebrew word "*one sent.*" Our four gospels were written in Greek, but our Lord spoke Aramaic, so that in any passage where in the Greek He is reported as addressing the Twelve Disciples as *apostoloi* it would be reasonable to suppose that the word which He actually used was the Aramaic *shelucha*, or possibly the Hebrew *shaliach*.

It is worth noting that in point of fact there is no such passage in the Gospels. Our Lord is never reported as addressing the Twelve as Apostles. Even in the account of the call of the Twelve in St Mark iii, 14 the words "whom also He named Apostles" are not found in an important group of manuscripts and are regarded by many modern textual authorities as an interpolation from St Luke (vi, 13). St Luke often refers to the Twelve as Apostles, and very early in Christian tradition that became their common designation. It was strongly argued by Dr Kirsopp Lake that it was the Greek-speaking Church of Antioch "which hit on the idea of using the rare but natural word

apostolos."[1] Dr Kirsopp Lake's note on *The Twelve and the Apostles*[2] is an important one, but Dom Gregory Dix makes no reference to it.[3]

But let that pass. Let us assume, for the moment, that our Lord did use the word *shelucha* or the word *shaliach* of the Twelve. We have to inquire what these words mean and imply. Dom Gregory Dix refers us to vol. iii of Strack-Billerbeck's *Kommentar zum N.T. aus Talmud und Midrasch*, pp. 2 *ff*. This massive German commentary aims at throwing light on the New Testament from rabbinic sources. But these rabbinic sources have to be used with discrimination. A good popular account of them was given by one of my old and revered teachers at Cambridge, the late Dr Israel Abrahams, in a little book entitled *A Short History of Jewish Literature*.[4] The literature in question consists of Talmud and Midrash. There is the Palestinian Talmud completed about 370 A.D., and the Babylonian Talmud completed about 500 A.D. The central part of the Talmud is the *Mishnah*, which reached its present form about 200 A.D.; the rest is commentary (*Gemara*). The commentary contains earlier material of uncertain date. The best indication of the date of a saying is its association with the name of some Rabbi whose approximate date is known.

The word "Midrash" means "study," and Midrash consists of commentary upon books of the Old Testament. One of the earliest and most interesting is that on part of the book of Exodus (*Mekilta*—which means "measure" or "rule"). In its original form this Midrash goes back to the beginning of the second century A.D. The rather similar works, *Sifra* ("the Book"), which is a commentary on Leviticus, and *Sifre* ("Books"), on Numbers v to the end of Deuteronomy, belong to the third century A.D., and also contain earlier material. Strack-Billerbeck's note, to which Dom Gregory Dix refers, is attached to the word *Apostle* in Rom. i, 1. "Apostle" is equated with "*shaliach*," as the word is used in Talmud and Midrash, and a number of illustrations are given of its use to mean "agent" or "representative." I have looked up the five passages quoted from the Mishnah. *Berakoth* v, 5 is thus translated by Professor Danby: "If he that says the *Tefillah* falls into error it is a bad omen for him; and if he was the *agent* of the congregation it is a bad omen for them that appointed him, because a man's *agent* is like to himself."[5] Here "the agent of the congregation" is the precentor who recites the prayers. He is referred to again in *Rosh ha-Shanah* iv, 9: "Like as the *agent* of the congregation is bound [*i.e.*, say the daily *Tefillah*] so is each person bound. Rabban Gamaliel

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[1] *The Beginnings of Christianity*, Foakes-Jackson and Lake, vol. v (Additional Notes, p. 50).

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 37-59.

[3] Nor does he refer to A. Harnack's interesting examination of the evidence in *Mission und Ausbreitung*, ed. 4, pp. 340 *ff*.

[4] Fisher Unwin (1906). For a more detailed account see Oesterley and Box, *A Short Survey of the Literature of Rabbinical and Mediæval Judaism* (S.P.C.K., 1920).

[5] This is the one quotation given by Dom Gregory Dix in a footnote, p. 229. There is a slip in the footnote on p. 235. The reference here is not to the Mishnah but to the Gemara.

says: The *agent* of the congregation fulfils the obligation that rests upon the many." This latter passage is not mentioned in Strack-Billerbeck. *Kiddushin* ii, 1: "A man may betroth a woman either by his own act or by that of his *agent*; and a woman may become betrothed either by her own act or by that of her *agent*." . . . The Mishnaic tract *Gittin* deals with bills of divorce, and *Gittin* iii, 6 and iv, 1 refer to the *agent* (Danby here translates "messenger") by whom in certain circumstances a bill of divorce may be delivered. *Gittin* iii, 6 also mentions the *agent* (Danby here again translates "messenger") of the court (*beth ha din*) who may have a part to play in the matter.

The tract *Yoma* treats of the Day of Atonement. Special care was taken of the High Priest by elders of the Court, and on the eve of the Day itself "the elders of the Court delivered him to the elders of the priesthood, and they brought him up to the upper chamber of the House of Abtinas. They adjured him and took their leave and went away having said to him, 'My lord High Priest, we are *delegates*' [so Danby translates] 'of the Court, and thou art our *delegate* and the *delegate* of the Court. We adjure thee by him that made his name to dwell in this house that thou change naught of what we have said unto thee.' He turned aside and wept and they turned aside and wept" (*Yoma* i, 5).

These then are the five passages in question from the Mishnah. Of those from the Gemara (the "commentary" part of the Talmud) the most interesting and relevant are two which associate the saying at the end of the quotation from *Berakoth* v. 5 (above), "a man's *agent* is like to himself," with R. Joshua ben Karhah (*c.* A.D. 150) and R. Jonathan (*c.* A.D. 140). Like many another rabbinic commonplace, this little dictum occurs a number of times in the vast corpus of the Talmud.

It appears then that *shaliach* is not a technical term; it represents no formal "institution": it simply means "agent" or "representative," with a connotation varying with the context in which it is found. If our Lord used the term with reference to the Twelve, as in certain circumstances His *agents* or *representatives*, we can gather no more from its use than from such a familiar saying as "He that receiveth you receiveth me, and he that receiveth me receiveth him that sent me" (St Matthew x, 40). And we may compare St Luke x, 11 (in the context of the sending out of the Seventy): "He that heareth you heareth me; and he that despiseth you despiseth me; and he that despiseth me despiseth him that sent me."

The Jewish texts containing the word *shaliach*, therefore, carry us no further than we were before; and Dom Gregory Dix's observation that "it is one of the curiosities of the situation of English scholarship at the moment that they have been rigidly excluded from all recent Anglican discussions of the origins of the ministry" is singularly wide of the mark. It is not even accurate to say that they have been *rigidly* excluded.

In the volume published by the S.P.C.K. in 1930 under the title *Episcopacy Ancient and Modern*, edited by Dr Claude Jenkins and

Bishop K. D. Mackenzie, there is a well-informed discussion of the Jewish "apostle" (pp. 2, 3); and that commonplace from the rabbinic literature is actually quoted: "The *sent* of a man is as himself."

It will be a curiosity of the situation of English ecclesiasticism if this ordinary Hebrew word *shaliach* dazzles the assembled episcopate at Lambeth. It is unlikely, but not perhaps impossible, for the eyes of some episcopal advisers are blinking already. Dom Gregory Dix's admirers are quick to fasten on his more purple passages. Here for example is a paragraph taken from a book just issued by the American Church Union, *Lambeth and Unity*, edited by Dr Louis A. Haselmayer of Yale:[1] "As Jesus . . . is the *shaliach* or plenipotentiary of God, so after his Ascension the Twelve are His plenipotentiaries, empowered like him by the Messianic Spirit to fulfil and continue His own Messianic Mission." The quotation is accurate. The words occur on page 230 of Dom Gregory Dix's essay. The *shaliach*—the *plenipotentiary*, surely a most unfortunate word. Our Divine Lord has no plenipotentiaries on earth. The idea that He ever could have has been one of the besetting illusions of the Catholic Church.

In certain circles, both Catholic and Barthian, there is a tendency nowadays to underestimate the Hellenistic, and to over-emphasize the Jewish, influence in the early formative period of the Christian Church. According to Dom Gregory Dix, the first Christian generation, which he dates *c.* A.D. 30-67, formed itself and its institutions within the sphere of Judaism. But long before A.D. 67 Hellenistic influence had penetrated deeply into Christian thought and practice. Indeed, Judaism itself, certainly outside Palestine, and probably to an extent hardly yet appreciated within that country too, had proved itself permeable to Hellenistic suggestion. It was not until after the destruction of Jerusalem that the remnants of the Jewish people grew the hard shell of rabbinic rigidity. The rabbinic literature to which reference has been made in this paper represents what the later rabbis thought *ought to have been*, though it also contains, no doubt, genuine reminiscences of what *was*.

When the Greek word *apostolos* was adopted by Jews is uncertain. The envoys of the Jewish Patriarch in the fourth century A.D. were certainly called *apostoloi*. No doubt there were messengers earlier, and for them the Jews may have used the word *shaliach*. Whether they translated this word into Greek as *apostolos* we do not know.

In the first century, before the destruction of the temple in A.D. 70 there was an authorized poll tax on all Jews of the Dispersion, and this was collected and brought to Jerusalem.[2] But these collectors were not representatives of the high priests, as the *apostoloi* of the fourth century were of the Jewish patriarch. They were delegates of the various Jewish settlements. The word *apostolos* may have been used of them; but we have no evidence that it was. And if it was, it was plainly used as the word *apostolos* is used of Epaphroditus in Phil. ii, 25 as meaning not *plenipotentiary* but *messenger*. At this point again Dom Gregory Dix is

[1] Page 152. [2] Philo, *De spec. leg.* i, 77.

going beyond the evidence. "There were," he states, "Jewish 'apostles' of the high priest and sanhedrin." Very likely there were messengers of some sort, but whether they were called *apostoloi* is uncertain, and that they were *plenipotentiaries* is unlikely. And these are precisely the points at issue. But we need pursue Dom Gregory Dix's "institution" of *plenipotentiary* no further. He has crystallized a custom (that of authorizing an agent or delegate) into a formal "institution," as if there had been a *shaliachate*; and for this there is no historical justification.

J. W. TRURON.

The Church and Marriage

THE purpose of this article is twofold: first, to make a critical examination of two of the proposed Canons, and second, in the light of such examination, to suggest the principles on which the Church should act in the matter of marriage. Before proceeding, however, to consider the proposed Canons, it is necessary shortly to state what appears to be the present position of the Church, in regard to marriage, divorce, and remarriage after divorce.

Marriage. Apart from the question of admission to the Holy Communion, with which this article is not concerned, the Church's concern with the question "Is A married?" arises in regard to A's capacity to contract a new or another marriage—*i.e.*, if A asks the Church to celebrate his marriage, the Church is clearly concerned to know that no impediment, in the way of an existing marriage, subsists. If A be already married in the eye of the secular law, so that any purported new marriage would be, by that law, a nullity and bigamous, the Church will obviously refuse to assist A in the commission of the legal offence. The canonical validity, or invalidity, of his subsisting marriage is clearly irrelevant. In other words, the question "Is A married?" must be answered by reference to the secular law; in England the law of England. In the majority of cases A will be an Englishman, and the answer to the question admits of no difficulty, but cases may sometimes arise where A is a foreigner, possibly a Mahomedan or Hindu domiciled in a polygamous country, which will complicate matters. The principle of English law is that the English law treats a man as married whenever he is so regarded by the law of his domicile. Accordingly, the English Court of Appeal held that a Hindu, domiciled in India, who had in India entered into a potentially polygamous marriage with a Hindu woman, was a married man and therefore incapable of contracting a marriage in England with an Englishwoman.[1] Clearly if the Church were asked to celebrate such a marriage (to an Englishwoman) she would refuse.

Divorce and Remarriage. Nearly all countries, including of course England, provide by their laws for the dissolution of marriage, com-

[1] Baindail *v.* Baindail, *Law Reports*, 1946 Probate, p. 122.

monly called divorce. The general rule is that, in divorce suits, the courts of the country of domicile have exclusive jurisdiction, and also that English law recognizes the legal efficacy of divorces granted by the courts of the domicile. In other words, a man's marriage is, by English law, held to be validly dissolved, and he free to contract a new marriage, whenever that is his position by the law of his domicile. Similarly, the courts of the country of domicile have jurisdiction, though not always exclusive, in nullity suits, and English law recognizes a decree of nullity granted by such courts.

As regards the legal position of the Church, the general rule is that any parishioner has a right to be married by the incumbent in his parish church. This right does not depend on his being a member of the Church, either practising or at all. It is possible, though far from certain, that a parishioner who had not been baptized has no such right, but it is quite certain that a baptized nonconformist has. To this general rule there now exists one statutory exception. Section 12 of the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, takes away this right where either party to the proposed marriage has living a former spouse whom he has, or by whom he has been, divorced. Between 1857 and 1937 the above right was taken away only where one party had been the respondent in the divorce suit, and in such a case the incumbent could not refuse to allow his church to be used for the remarriage if a duly qualified clergyman was willing to take the marriage. Although this provision largely represented the view widely prevalent in the Church during the last century, viz., that remarriage was permissible to the "innocent" party to a divorce for adultery (then the only ground for divorce by English law), there was always a large number of the clergy who protested against it, even to the extent of disobeying the law. In the last twenty years or so the Church has come to realize that this view not only is, and always has been, in conflict with her own official formularies, but is definitely contrary to our Lord's teaching, as interpreted by the Catholic Church. Accordingly the present almost universal rule and practice is for the Church to refuse absolutely to celebrate a remarriage after divorce and during the lifetime of the former spouse. The ground for such refusal is, and must be, that the dissolved marriage is, in truth, still subsisting: in technical terms, that the impediment of *ligamen* exists. It necessarily follows that, if such remarriage does take place, whether in church, chapel or register office, the resulting union is not marriage at all, but merely a legal relationship which the law calls "marriage" and to which it attaches the same legal consequences. The above statutory curtailment of a parishioner's right to be married in his parish church where there has been a divorce does not apply where there has been a decree of nullity, whatever the grounds for such decree. Such a decree declares that the parties are not, and never have been, husband and wife, and they have precisely the same rights to church marriage as if the annulled marriage had never taken place. If previously they were bachelor and spinster, that is their respective status as the result of the decree.

Whenever the Church refuses, as she is entitled to refuse, to celebrate the marriage of A with B, on the ground that A's previous marriage

with X has been dissolved by secular authority, and X is still living, she is, by necessary implication, making a judgment as to the canonical quality of the marriage of A with X. The question of its legal—*i.e.*, secularly legal—quality, which, as before stated, arises where there has been no divorce, cannot now arise: it has become irrelevant. The content of this judgment may be thus stated: (i) no canonical impediment existed to the marriage of A with X, *and* (ii) *either* the marriage was consummated, *or* if not consummated, the grounds on which it was dissolved were not, by canon law, sufficient. It is quite clear, by catholic teaching, now accepted by the Church of England, first that impediments to marriage exist which are not recognized as such by secular law; and secondly that only consummated marriages are absolutely incapable of being dissolved: unconsummated marriages can be dissolved by the Church for grave cause.[1]

The present position into which the Church has put herself by her policy of always refusing to celebrate a remarriage after divorce is that, without ever examining the facts of any case, she in all cases passes judgment in the above terms. It is becoming increasingly clear that in many cases such a judgment—which is one of contingent fact—is simply untrue, and many Anglican writers[2] have urged that, without abandoning the presumption that every marriage is *verum matrimonium*, the Church should allow any individual affected to rebut the presumption by showing that it is untrue in his case. This would, of course, mean the establishment by the Church of her own tribunals. Probably the most clear case is where, in the example above given, X had living, at the date of her marriage to A, a former husband Y, whom she had, or by whom she had been, divorced. The absurdity of the Church, in this case, treating the marriage of A to X as *verum matrimonium* and an impediment to A's marriage to B is too clear to need emphasis. Apart from this clear case, there are also others where it can be proved with reasonable certainty that the parties to the dissolved marriage definitely excluded some essential element, *e.g.* permanence, and so never consented to true marriage.[3] The result is that many a parish priest is faced with the difficult alternatives of either obeying his bishop and refusing to marry in church many couples whose marriages he has strong grounds for thinking are permitted by Church law, or of defying his bishop and marrying them in church. Any parish priest of experience must know the difficulties in which such a dilemma places him, and what harm the Church suffers from the existence—quite needless—of such a dilemma.

The Proposed Canons. Canon XXXVI, Section 2 reads thus: "If in

[1] The Pauline privilege has been ignored for present purposes, as it has probably fallen into desuetude in the Church of England. A Canon could restore it, but none is proposed.

[2] Report of Joint Committees of Convocations (1935), S.P.C.K. The present writer's *What is Christian Marriage?* (1944, Macmillan and Co. Ltd.), and *Marriage, Divorce and the Church: Reform or Chaos* (1946, S.P.C.K., *Theology* Occasional Paper), and, most recently Lacey, *Marriage in Church and State*, revised edition by Canon Mortimer.

[3] For an instance, see F. L. Cross, *Darwell Stone*, p. 315.

regard to a marriage which has been duly dissolved by secular law the Bishop of a diocese, sitting with his Chancellor, is satisfied that there were good grounds upon which such marriage could, instead of being dissolved, have been declared to be null and void, it shall be lawful for such Bishop in his discretion to allow either of the parties to such marriage, although the other of them is still living, to marry, or to be married to, another person, according to the rites and ceremonies of the Church of England, in like manner as if such first mentioned marriage had been declared to be null and void."

There are several matters worth noticing here. First it does not really set up a court at all to which any aggrieved person can come as of right: it merely purports to give to diocesan bishops a discretionary jurisdiction which they almost certainly already possess (see Phillimore, *Ecclesiastical Law*, 2nd ed., pp. 912 and 930-1). Whether a particular marriage, which under section 12 of the 1937 Act the parish priest is not compelled to celebrate or to allow to be celebrated in church, should or should not take place there is a question, ultimately, for the bishop of the diocese, as *judex ordinarius*. Secondly, it involves the most extraordinary subservience to the secular law, not merely of England or Scotland, but of whatever country granted the divorce. The Canon in effect provides that the Church may accept, as good grounds for nullity, not only all the grounds but also only the grounds recognized for the time being by the law of whatever country was the domicile of the divorced spouses. As the grounds for nullity vary widely in different countries,[1] as well as being subject to statutory change in any one country, the bishop might find that, of two cases involving exactly the same facts, he could relieve one but not the other. Certainly as regards England, and probably many other countries as well, the Canon excludes all grounds of defective intention, as well as the very clear ground that one party to the dissolved marriage had then living a former spouse. As probably the Commission's attention was directed only to English cases, which obviously would be the majority, what follows will be restricted to these.

Before the Canon can operate at all, it is necessary for the party applying to the bishop to prove that at the date of the divorce there existed grounds on which, at that date, the State court which granted the divorce could, if so asked, have granted a decree of nullity instead of divorce. The Canon does not state whether a further hypothesis has to be introduced as to who had asked the State court for the decree of nullity—*i.e.*, whether the petitioner in the divorce suit. In cases where the marriage is void *ab initio*—*i.e.*, bigamy[2]—a decree can be granted at the instance of any interested person as well as the parties to the bigamous marriage; where however the marriage is voidable only (*e.g.*, for impotence) it can be granted, never at the instance of anyone other than the spouses, and usually at the instance of one of them only,

[1] In Scotland none of the new English statutory grounds, wilful refusal to consummate, concealed pregnancy of wife by another man, or concealed epilepsy, exist.

[2] In this case a decree of nullity is not strictly necessary at all, though it is usually safer to get one, for evidential purposes.

namely the one aggrieved. A very great anomaly, which would however be only transient, lies in the fact that in many cases the bishop will or will not have jurisdiction under the Canon according to whether the divorce was obtained before or after the 1937 Matrimonial Causes Act came into operation.

It will help in understanding the curious working out of this Canon to take one or two hypothetical cases.

Case 1. Husband and wife marry: husband refuses to consummate the marriage and goes off to live with another woman. By State law alternative remedies are open to the wife—divorce or nullity based on the 1937 Act. She chooses divorce. The Canon applies and she can ask the bishop for leave to marry in church.

Case 2. The facts are the same as in Case 1, except that the divorce suit was brought in 1936, divorce being then the only remedy. Here the bishop would have no jurisdiction under the Canon, and the wife could never during the husband's lifetime marry in church.

Case 3. Wife either refuses, or is incapable of consummating the marriage. Husband commits adultery and the wife divorces him. The wife could not have asked the State court for nullity if it were a case of her refusal, but she might if she was incapable and the husband's adultery was held to amount to a repudiation of the marriage.

Whether in either case the bishop would have jurisdiction under the Canon depends on the somewhat obscure point whether on its true construction it is restricted to cases where the decree of nullity could have been obtained at the suit of the spouse who obtained the divorce, or of either party. In both cases under 3 above, the husband could have obtained a decree of nullity.

The above hypothetical cases—none of them unusual—indicate the extremely arbitrary way the proposed Canon would work, and also the difficult questions which its application would involve. Another matter to observe is that the bishop *may*, in his discretion, "allow either of the parties . . . to marry." Does this mean that it is open to him to make different decisions in the case of each party to the same marriage—*i.e.*, that the wife may remarry but the husband may not? If so it proposes a distinction far more arbitrary than the much criticized "innocent" party rule. It may be that this is not intended, but the matter should be made clear.

Canon XXXVIII, Section 1 reads thus: "No person who has already been married but whose marriage has been dissolved by secular authority shall marry, except as provided by Canon XXXVI, so long as the husband or wife to whom that person was married is still living."

It is to be observed that the proposed Canons contain no interpretation clause, and that "married" is nowhere defined. But according to the ordinary rules of construction, as well as in the context, the phrase "has already been married" must mean "married according to the law of the State," and includes a man who, having divorced or been divorced by his former spouse, has remarried in her lifetime. If, therefore, his second wife divorces him she will be incapable of remarrying. As above pointed out, no relief in such a case is possible

under Canon XXXVI. This result is quite fantastic, and the basis of the prohibition obscure: it cannot be the impediment of *ligamen*, or bond of existing marriage, as the woman's union to a man with a previous wife living is a nullity according to Church law, and the secular tie has been dissolved.

The proposed Canons will come before the Convocations in May. Several amendments have been put down: some to delete both those we have been considering. The two most important to Canon XXXVI, 2 are one to make the relief a matter of right, instead of discretion, and one to add the canonical grounds to the present ones: this amendment is in the York Convocation. There are also amendments to make the archbishop, instead of the bishop, the judge.

Turning from criticism to constructive suggestions, in the writer's opinion, an opinion shared by many more qualified than he, not only should the scope of the relief be wider, but the Church should attack the problem earlier. She should press for such legislation as is necessary to enable her to insist, as a condition of marrying any two people in church, that they receive, if thought necessary, full instruction in the Church's doctrine of marriage. She should also be free to decide for herself what shall be impediments to marriage—*i.e.*, non-baptism of one or both parties[1]—as also what constitutes the impediment of *ligamen*. In this connexion she should not be bound, as she now is, to accept every decree of nullity, whether of the English or a foreign court.[2] Finally, she should set up her own tribunal, to which any person whose previous marriage had been dissolved by secular authority can come as of right for a decision on the canonical validity or invalidity of this marriage, and the tribunal should have jurisdiction, where the dissolved marriage had not been consummated for reasons other than impotence or incapacity at the time of the wedding, to decree its dissolution if there appeared to be sufficient grounds. In neither case would either party thereby become automatically qualified for church marriage, but if it were refused it would not be on the ground of a subsisting marriage. The chairman or president of such a court should be, not a bishop or archbishop, but a barrister of standing, who would be trained to determine questions of fact after hearing the relevant evidence, though he should be assisted by priests with knowledge of the Canon law. Such a court might well bear the same relation to the bishop or archbishop as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council bears to the King in Council: its judgments being in the form of humble advice, but in fact invariably accepted, and the actual decision in form that of the bishop or archbishop.

In view of the widespread indifference to or ignorance of Christianity, as well as of the failure of the Church in the not very distant past to proclaim the true teaching, and also of the whole psychological background into which many couples enter marriage, considerable latitude might properly be shown in many cases, and any reasonable doubt as

[1] As above stated, it is very doubtful whether, in the existing state of the law, the Church is entitled to refuse on this ground.

[2] This must not be taken to mean that the writer thinks that the present English grounds should not be accepted by the Church.

to the validity of the dissolved marriage resolved *in favorem fidei*, where the party applying had since become converted to the faith.[1]

A. T. Macmillan.

Archbishop Wake and Intercommunion

In my essay on "The Church of England and Non-episcopal Churches in the XVIth and XVIIth Centuries" (*Theology* Occasional Papers, New Series, No. 11), I endeavoured, on the basis of evidence already published, to offer an historical interpretation of the Anglican attitude to the question of non-episcopal ministries and sacraments and the practical problem of intercommunion. Since writing that essay and in reading some of the correspondence of Archbishop Wake with foreign churches and divines, I have realized that the conclusion adumbrated in my paper is strongly supported by the evidence of his formal and official authorization of intercommunion between Anglicans and members of continental Reformed Churches.

It is well known of course that Wake was probably the primate most concerned with the fostering of an œcumenical movement before the present century, and that his correspondence embraced projects for a union of the Gallican and Anglican Churches as well as correspondence about union with several foreign Protestant Churches, Lutheran and Reformed. The evidence of his negotiations is too voluminous (in the literal sense of that word) to be summarized in a brief comment, and much new evidence is extant both of his correspondence with the Gallican doctors of the Sorbonne and of his ubiquitous commerce with European Protestants of many countries. Pending the full recital which I hope some day to present, it may be of particular interest to draw attention, in reinforcement of the conclusions of my paper, to some practical features of his proposals. For Wake was concerned not only to commend to his correspondents the ideal of a reunited church but also to offer concrete and practical suggestions to that end.

In his correspondence with foreign Protestants he insisted on the claims of episcopal government to descend from the apostolic church and to be the indispensable basis and condition of corporate reunion; on the possibility of using the services of English bishops as means of restoring episcopal ordination to the foreign Reformed churches; on the freedom which would be allowed, once granted the restoration of the episcopate, in the minor aspects of ecclesiastical discipline; and on the practical step *interim* of the mutual approval of the communicating of members of each other's churches when travelling in the territory of a particular Protestant church. In relation to the reciprocal intercommunion of Anglicans and Lutherans many examples could be quoted; but the following case relating to members of a Swiss Reformed church is of particular interest and importance as illustrating nearly all of the fundamental principles of Wake's policy.

On February 12, 1717, Peter Zeller, Antistes of the Church of

[1] *Cf.* Lacey, *Marriage in Church and State*, new edition, p. 207.

Zurich, wrote to Wake a letter conveying the congratulations of the church of Zurich on his succession to the primacy, commending the primate's zeal for reunion, and recalling the close connexion between Zurich and England during the reign of Edward VI. In his reply of March 1 (old style), 1717, Wake began by explaining the recent civil disturbances in Great Britain caused by the Jacobite rebellion, and continued to deplore and explain the religious divisions caused by the obstinate schisms of the various Protestant dissenters, who refused to to remain in the communion of the established church. He was at particular pains to repudiate the suggestion that these dissenters were the authentic brethren of the foreign Reformed churches, and as evidence of the fraternal unity of the Church of England with the Swiss Reformed churches he laid down his practical principles for reunion.

Optamus, et vehementer quidem optamus, vetus illud ac, quantum ex historia sacra colligere possumus, Apostolicum ecclesiae regimen, episcopale, quale apud nos obtinet, ubique fuisse retentum. Oramus communem nostrum Dominum, ut suo tempore omnibus Reformatis ecclesiis hunc ordinem restituat, et restitutum usque ad finem saeculi conservet. Confidimus hoc iis a clementissimo Servatore nostro aliquando concedendum fore.

In caeteris unicuique ecclesiae suam libertatem concedimus, eam sibi disciplinam instituendi quam suis usibus maxime accomodatam, vel ratione ducti vel experientia edocti rectores ejus judicaverint. Haec de vobis, venerande Antistes, sentiunt omnes saniores ecclesiae nostrae symmystae. Haec de nobis etiam vos pariter sentire et scimus et gaudemus.

Quotquot e nostris peregre ad vos proficiscuntur, ut juxta hanc sententiam una vobiscum communicant, et permittimus et hortamur. Vestros hic agentes libenter ad sacra nostra admittimus; nec vos prohibetis. Hanc sanctorum communionem illibatem semper conservemus. Sic de nobis invice sentiamus ut de fratribus in Christo charissimis.

The importance of this primatial act as an official and formal authorization of intercommunion between members of the Church of England and of the Reformed Church of Zurich when visiting each other's country is evident. Nor are its implications concerning the validity of the sacraments of the Swiss Reformed Church less significant. But it has a further importance in view of the character and churchmanship of the particular archbishop whose policy it declares. For Wake was a high churchman as the divines of Queen Anne's day understood that term. A whig in politics (because the alternative of a Stuart restoration was impracticable), he retained the high church principles which had characterized his early years as chaplain to the British ambassador at Paris during the later period of Charles II (when, for example, he had earned notoriety as a defender and minister of auricular confession). In domestic affairs he was a stout opponent of the Protestant dissenters, whom he qualified as schismatics and even opposed their relief by the repeal of the Occasional Conformity and Schism Acts; and a vehement opponent of all heretics whether on the

question of the doctrine of the Trinity at that time much debated, or the equally vexed Bangorian controversy. At the same time he entered on his part into serious discussions with Gallican divines of the Sorbonne concerning the practicability of union between the English and French Churches. In view of Wake's orthodoxy in belief, his catholic and comprehensive conception of ecclesiastical union, and his readiness to open discussions with both Roman Catholic and Protestant abroad, his express approval of intercommunion with the Reformed Church at Zurich is of great significance. Not only does it afford incontrovertible evidence of his own attitude and of the prevalent Anglican tradition, but it establishes also a precedent of not inconsiderable weight in the consideration of Anglican practice towards non-episcopal foreign Churches.

NORMAN SYKES.

Studies in Texts

THE CUP OF WRATH AND THE CUP OF BLESSING

"And they offered him wine mingled with myrrh: but he received it not" (Mk. xv, 23).

The usual interpretation of this passage is to the effect that our Lord refused the charitable gift of a drug because He wished to retain the clarity of His mind until the end. But is it not also a possibility that the regulations for the Day of Atonement underly this statement? He who, in this same Gospel, declared that He came "to give his life a ransom for many" (x, 45), and who therefore considered His death as an atoning act, could not have been ignorant of the rules of the yearly festival, preserved in the Mishnah, according to which "on the Day of Atonement, eating, drinking, washing, anointing, putting on sandals, and marital intercourse are forbidden" (Yoma viii, 1). If this be so, our Lord may have refused the draught of set purpose, in order to fulfil the sacrificial law for that day. It may also be suggested that the same proscription was in the mind of the evangelist and that this in part determined his account of the women's visit to the sepulchre to anoint the body, not on the day of Jesus' death—*i.e.*, not on the day of the Atonement when anointing was forbidden—but later after the Sabbath was over.

However, if St Mark, like the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, had indeed the law of the Day of Atonement in mind when he wrote his account of the Crucifixion, it is apparent that St John had no such preconception, for according to his narrative Jesus said, "I thirst," and received vinegar and His body was bound in linen cloths with myrrh and aloes immediately prior to being placed in the tomb. Nevertheless, the idea of atonement, though unconnected with the Jewish feast, is clearly evident in the Johannine narrative.

The more obvious meaning of the phrase "I thirst" is that Jesus, wearied by His intense suffering, called for something to moisten His parched lips so that He might be enabled to utter His last triumphant cry. John may indeed have inserted this for anti-Docetic purposes to

stress the reality of Jesus' physical agony, although it is to be noted that no direct quotation of this saying is made by any of the ante-Nicene Fathers in their refutations of that heresy. But the writer of the fourth Gospel frequently infuses into his account a wider and deeper meaning than is necessarily warranted by the immediate context. Just as the Eucharistic discourse follows upon the feeding of the multitude and the account of the Institution is omitted, so here it is possible that Jesus' word from the cross refers to that cup of which He spake in His prayer in the garden of Gethsemane, the prayer of which the Johannine writer gives no report, except in a passing reference when Peter attempts to defend Jesus from arrest (xviii, 11).

The word for cup, *ποτήριον*, is the one employed in the Septuagint, and is found for example in Jeremiah xxv, 15 and Isaiah li, 17, where the main idea is that of suffering for sin. In the former passage the prophet is commanded by Yahweh to take "the cup of the wine of this fury at my hand," and give it to the nations as a punishment for their wrong-doing. In the Deutero-Isaiah passage, possibly borrowed from Jeremiah, it is Jerusalem herself who is said to have drunk the "cup of staggering"; but later in the same chapter (v. 22), with prophetic foreshortening, the cup is declared to have been "taken out of thine hand . . . thou shalt no more drink it again." The same conception appears in Psalm lxxv, 8: "For in the hand of the Lord there is a cup, and the wine foameth [R.V. Mg., 'is red']; it is full of mixture, and he poureth out of the same: surely the dregs thereof, all the wicked of the earth shall wring them out" (R.V. Mg., "drain and drink them"), or as Oesterley emends the last phrase, "Its dregs are never drained out, all the wicked of the earth drink it." It is against this background that we are to understand Jesus' usage of the word "cup," as He makes quite plain when answering the request of the sons of Zebedee to occupy the places of honour in His kingdom (Mk. x, 38)—the cup there means the suffering of the cross. So the sense of the Pauline phrase to have "the fellowship of his sufferings" (Phil. iii, 10) can be rendered by Polycarp to "have a part in the number of thy martyrs, in the cup of thy Christ" (*Martyrdom* xiv). Consequently, Jesus' prayer in Gethsemane was a request to the Father that He might be spared the suffering which is the supreme penalty for sin. Yet He was ready to drink the cup of wrath if atonement could be achieved in no other way, and so "not what I will, but what thou wilt" (Mk. xiv, 36). Therefore on the cross, when He said, "I thirst," He was expressing His eagerness for the consummation, His desire to drain the cup to the dregs on behalf of fallen mankind.

We may go further still and suggest that the cup of the Last Supper too is connected with this theme—"This cup is the new covenant in my blood" (Lk. xxii, 20). The cup of the divine wrath is transformed into the "cup of salvation" (Ps. cxvi, 13) by the sacrifice of the Lamb; the blood outpoured inaugurates the new covenant and at the same time provides the matter of the eschatological meal which is a foretaste of the heavenly banquet.

The draining of the cup of wrath is not in itself the completion of the atoning act; the death of Christ is indeed all-important, but it

derives its significance and power from the blood, by means of which the new life is made available to man. There is thus an intimate association between the cup of wrath and the Eucharistic cup; the one is the necessary prelude to the other; by means of the one the new life released by the other is given to the Israel of God. This inter-relationship of the two cups is implicit in the statement of the author of Hebrews that our Lord is "a priest for ever after the order of Melchizedek" (vii, 17). He entered the veil and there wrought atonement for man in virtue of His priesthood; the offerer and the victim were one, and equally in virtue of that priesthood He gives to man the fruits of His sacrifice in the Eucharist of which He remains the perpetual celebrant. Thus the early Fathers, both in their writings and in the iconography which was inspired by them, saw in the offering of Melchizedek to Abraham not only a foreshadowing of the atonement, but also of the Eucharistic sacrifice. (*Cf. Clement Strom.* IV, xxv, and mosaics in Sta Maria Maggiore, Rome, and S. Vitale, Ravenna.)

The relationship between the two cups must always be present to the mind of the believer, because as St Paul affirms, when writing to the Corinthians, the cup of blessing can become once again the cup of divine fury, for whosoever drinks of it unworthily "drinketh judgement unto himself" (xi, 29).

J. G. Davies.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Dr Lowther Clarke is a Canon Residentiary of Chichester Cathedral.

Mr Macmillan is the author of *What is Christian Marriage?* etc.

Dr Sykes is Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History in the University of Cambridge.

The Rev. J. G. Davies, B.D., is curate of the Church of St Mary and St Paul, Rotherhithe.

CORRESPONDENCE

PRAYER BOOK REVISION

To the Editor of Theology.

Sir,

In a review of Mgr Knox's new version of the Psalms which is before me, the Bishop of London expresses the opinion that "the Prayer Book Version of the Psalms . . . is perhaps the finest prose translation of Hebrew verse that has ever been produced." With this judgment I, no less than Brother George Every, find myself in complete agreement. But truth and intelligibility must be admitted to have strong claims when it is a matter of taking the Psalms into use for congregational Christian worship; and, even at the risk of seeming to be a Philistine in the eyes of all lovers of great literature, I would plead for such a revision of Coverdale's noble work as would preserve to us a very large part of what he wrote, and yet enable the people to sing with the understanding and without offence.

O. Hardman.

THE LAND AND SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

SIR,

Many of us have read with great appreciation Mr W. S. Boycott's article in your February issue on "The Land and Sacramental Theology." It contains, however, one rather surprising statement which should not be allowed to go unquestioned—the statement that "It is St Augustine, followed by St Thomas Aquinas, Calvin, Karl Barth and others, who has defended, and defended nobly, a dualist theology."

I do not know enough about Calvin and Barth to judge the truth of this statement as applied to them; but I would suggest that to Augustine and Aquinas it quite definitely does not apply. It is true that they hold that matter and spirit are distinct, and that of the two spirit has the primacy; but they emphatically do not hold that they are in any way antithetic, still less that matter is evil or the source of evil. On the contrary, that is a heresy to which they are both most resolutely and explicitly opposed.

A few quotations from *The City of God* will make Augustine's position clear. The whole universe, in all its parts, is the outward expression of the Divine Wisdom and Goodness. "What means that saying that goes through all, 'And God saw that it was good,' but the approbation of the work made according to the workman's art, God's wisdom?" (Bk. XI, chap. 21). "Nothing at all in nature is evil . . . but everything from earth to heaven ascends in a scale of goodness. . . . And in the greatest is God, the great workman, yet no less is He in the less" (XI, 22). The material is not set over against the spiritual, but contained within it. "Christ in His spiritual flesh after His resurrection (yet was it His true flesh) ate and drank with His disciples. The need only, not the power, is taken from those glorified bodies, which are spiritual not because they cease to be bodies, but because they subsist by the quickening of the spirit" (XIII, 22). "Man shall not then be earthly but celestial, not that he shall leave his earthly body, but because he shall be so endowed from heaven that he may inhabit it without loss of his nature, but by attaining a celestial quality" (XIII, 23).

Augustine does indeed lay stress upon the corruption of the flesh; but that corruption is strictly unnatural, a perversion of nature which is the result of sin. And sin is essentially of the will, not of the body. "If any man say that the flesh is cause of the viciousness of the soul, he is ignorant of man's nature, for the corruptible body does but burden the soul. . . . And this corruption is the punishment of the first sin, not the cause. The corruptible flesh made not the soul to sin, but the sinning soul made the flesh corruptible" (XIV, 3). "We should not therefore injure our Creator by imputing our vices to our flesh. The flesh is good, but to leave the Creator and live according to this created good is the mischief" (XIV, 5). In short, the antithesis between Nature and Grace is a false one. Grace comes not to destroy but to

fulfil, to restore nature to that perfection with which it was originally created.

St Thomas Aquinas is no less emphatic. At the very beginning of the "Treatise on Creation" in the *Summa Theologica* he lays it down uncompromisingly that "It must be that every being in any way existing is from God" (*S.T.* I, Qu. 44, Art. i). A little later he argues against the existence of any First Principle of Evil. "There is no first principle of evil, as there is one first principle of good. First, because the first principle of good is essentially good. But nothing can be essentially bad; for every being, as such, is good, and evil can only exist in good as its subject. Secondly, because although evil always lessens good, yet it never wholly consumes it, and thus, while good ever remains, nothing can ever be wholly and perfectly bad. . . . Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle" (*S.T.* I, 49, iii). Evil, for Aquinas, is essentially self-destructive, for all being comes from God's goodness, and evil is therefore against being.

He argues repeatedly against the false belief of Origen that souls were created purely spiritual and imprisoned in bodies as a punishment for sin. The purpose of the created universe is to reflect the perfection of God to the fullest possible extent, and to do this all grades of being are required, from "prime matter" and the elements to the highest orders of angels. The existence of man, as a unity of soul and body, is a necessary part of this hierarchy of being, and his body is as much a part of his nature as his soul. "The intellectual soul holds the lowest place among intellectual substances, inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are, but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses. . . . Now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behoved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of the senses" (*S.T.* I, 76, v). The body is not the prison, but the God-given tool of the spirit. Matter indeed exists for spirit; but spirit, so far from abolishing it, takes it up into itself as a part of its being.

These few quotations are given to show that the theology of Augustine and Aquinas is through and through "sacramental" in just the sense that Mr Boycott requires. It is important that this should be emphasized, since the dualistic doctrine which suggests that matter and spirit are opposed is, as Mr Boycott suggests, one of the most prevalent and dangerous heresies of the age, and one which is commonly assumed to be part of the traditional, orthodox teaching of the Church. In fact, from the time of the Gnostics onwards the Church has fought continuously against that perversion of Platonism which sees in the body only a hindrance and a snare; and the great leaders of its theology have consistently held fast to the conviction that "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," and that "He looked on all that He had made, and behold, it was very good."

Yours, etc.,

E. C. E. Bourne.

Walton-le-Dale Vicarage, Preston.
February 20, 1948.

"THE WINTER'S TALE"

To the Editor of THEOLOGY.

DEAR SIR,

I do not believe in challenging reviewers whose opinions of my writings differ from my own. But with Dr Casson's review of my study of *The Winter's Tale*, in the March issue of THEOLOGY, the position is different, as questions of fact are involved. I do not recognize the two schools of Shakespearean criticism to which Dr Casson attaches me. The second one sounds a little odd. I can assure him that I do not believe "that poetry is addressed to the nervous system," whatever the phrase may mean. I have always said that Shakespearean drama, being poetic, must be apprehended by the *intellect*; it is naturalistic drama which is directly involved with the nervous system; Dr Casson might consult my *Shakespeare and the Popular Dramatic Tradition*, p. 64. The same work should convince him that, if I relegate stage technique to second place, I do not ignore it. I admit, however, that I do "suppose that the *Winter's Tale* was written for leisurely perusal in the study" as well as for dramatic performance. That is why we had a first Folio. Dr Greg, the distinguished Shakespearean textual critic, writes: "I do not think that Shakespeare, in his later days at least, wrote for the stage only" (*The Editorial Problem in Shakespeare*, p. viii).

It is also asserted that my "school" ignores the "textual history and present textual condition" of the plays. Yet I am later taken to task for "solemnly discussing" the question of an apostrophe (Dr Casson taking ten lines to object to my half footnote on the subject). It is Dr Casson who makes this apostrophe important, since he maintains that, in rejecting it, I am "discarding on grounds of personal preference the readings of a text pointed with unusual care"—that of the first Folio. This is very bewildering. For *the punctuation in question is not to be found in the first Folio*, whose text I was in fact defending. I found it in a note in the Furness *Variorum*, as Dr Casson would know if he had read *my* note properly—and I believe it to have been a misprint!

As to my "rampant subjectivism," I had understood it to be a platitude that an artist frequently aims at and achieves ends of which he is hardly aware. And how, I ask Dr Casson, is the discovery of such ends by the critic to be described as "subjectivism"? They are the artist's ends, not mine.

It is not too much to expect a reviewer to read the book he is reviewing and to check up his references before attacking the scholarship of his author.

Yours truly,

S. L. BETHELL.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE,
CATHAYS PARK, CARDIFF.

Dr Casson writes:

Full discussion of all the questions raised in Mr Bethell's letter would require an essay, and involve further encroachments on your space than you, Mr Editor, could be expected to concede.

Shakespeare's first Folio (F1) was published by two friends after his

death, from previously existing dramatic texts, or transcripts of them, or quartos. If he had written *The Winter's Tale* with one eye on future publication, is it not odd that he himself apparently made no attempt to get into print, and that the editors of F1 seem to have acquired their "copy" with some difficulty, at the last moment, to judge from the arrangement of the play, and from the signatures? (There is a blank sheet at the beginning and at the end, and it is printed on three quires, the signatures of which are unrelated to what follows.) Whatever significance is given to these facts, the sequence: (1) theatre, (2) dramatic text, (3) collected works, puts the emphasis in the right place, and provides the best approach for the critic of an Elizabethan play. Mr Bethell runs this course in the opposite direction, and is out of breath when he comes to the theatre. To change the metaphor: if he drives widdershins down a street marked One Way Traffic, he must not be surprised at protests.

Queenes is in fact the F1 reading, and I am delighted at this opportunity of correcting the error in my review. But that detail lies only on the periphery of the argument, the point of which Mr Bethell ignores. *The Winter's Tale* is not *The Faerie Queene*. It is a play, and has in the first place to be thought of in terms of spectacle and sound. What cannot be made intelligible to an audience by means of speech and gesture is possibly the critic reading something into the play that is not there.

If it is "a platitude that an artist frequently aims at and achieves ends of which he is hardly aware," then why does Mr. Bethell reiterate it so unnecessarily? Perhaps the time has come for it to share the fate of other platitudes, for its truth to be challenged, and for those who uphold it to be asked to produce reasons. To aim at an end of which one is not fully aware comes pretty near to being a contradiction in terms. If a man is unconscious of what he is "aiming" at, he cannot properly be said to be aiming at all. A random shot is not an aim.

Two questions may here be distinguished: (1) Is there anything in *The Winter's Tale* over and above what Shakespeare deliberately put there? (2) If so, can that something be known? My own position is agnostic. *Doctrina non potest esse nisi de ente.* A critic who can unhesitatingly supply affirmative answers is asserting by implication that he can be more articulate about the workings and the contents of Shakespeare's mind than the poet himself was—*i.e.*, the critic is making explicit, or bringing into the realm of statement, something that the poet was content to leave half said, if indeed he can be proved to have said it at all. In doing this, the critic will almost necessarily impose the patterns of his own mind upon those of the play. And this is subjectivism.

Mr Bethell commends me to his other book on Shakespeare. I read and profited by it when the ink was scarcely dry. I should have liked to report that the present work had fulfilled the promise of its predecessor.

BOOK REVIEWS

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND NON-EPISCOPAL CHURCHES IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES. An Essay towards an Historical Interpretation of the Anglican Tradition from Whitgift to Wake. By Norman Sykes. *Theology* Occasional Papers, New Series, No 11. S.P.C.K. 1s. 6d.

Professor Sykes' essay is, in its brevity, a weighty contribution to a discussion where historical material is constantly brought to bear on actual problems. It has the character of a reasoned *catena* of Anglican divines on the question of episcopacy as a criterion of a true Church. It is fairly easy to summarize his argument. The leading theologians of old classical Anglicanism were unanimous in regarding episcopacy as essential for the perfect state of a Church, and they were grateful that the Christian princes of their realm had in their wisdom bestowed this benefit upon their Church. But they were at the same time willing to acknowledge that other Churches which had not been so happy and consequently had been denied the privilege of an episcopal constitution were nevertheless Churches; and that Christian charity required that they should be treated as such. The Anglican divines were unanimous in distinguishing between matters of faith where no compromise was possible, and questions of order where the fundamental principles of religion were not involved. When on foreign soil they felt themselves free to communicate with the indigenous reformed Churches, and they did not hesitate to admit to communion in their own churches both Dutch and French refugees. That reordination was as a rule required when a foreign Reformed minister was admitted to the Anglican priesthood was regarded rather as a legal demand than as a question touching the religious validity of his ministrations, and in this respect reciprocity was considered a natural thing. It was in accordance with the conception of the classical Anglican divines that leading bishops in the eighteenth century saw nothing irregular in the "occasional conformity" of nonconformists.

In the field of modern English Church history Professor Sykes speaks with undisputed authority, and it would be bold to try to criticize his statements of fact. It might of course be argued that a collection of other quotations from the writings of the old divines might be compiled in order to support a contrary view. The author indeed does not conceal the fact that, *e.g.*, Richard Montague would not recognize orders that were not derived from episcopal ordination. But when Andrewes, Laud, Bramhall, Hall and Thorndike so clearly and so unanimously express their willingness to recognize non-episcopal Churches as real, though defective, Churches, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion: *Ecclesia Anglicana locuta est.*

It is tempting to add a few comments from the point of view of Swedish Lutheranism. The distinction made by the Anglican Fathers between matters of faith and questions of Church polity has a certain affinity to the well-known article in the Confession of Augsburg where it is stated: "Ad veram unitatem ecclesiae satis est consentire de

doctrina evangelii et administratione sacramentorum. Nec necesse est ubique esse similes traditiones humanas, seu ritus aut ceremonias, ab hominibus institutas" (Art. VII).

On the other hand, it is a fundamental principle of the Lutheran Reformation, "quod nemo debeat in ecclesia publice docere, aut sacramenta administrare, nisi rite vocatus" (Art. XIV).

In the Church of Sweden in the sixteenth century episcopacy was retained, although at least two godly princes would have preferred to abolish it. The Church Order of 1571 argues that there was at first no distinction between diverse duties of ministers, but as the number of Christian congregations grew, some were appointed overseers or bishops. This view would probably not have been accepted by contemporary (and later) Anglican divines—although it seems almost to coincide with Bishop Headlam's interpretation of the early history of the ministry in his Bampton Lectures—but they would hardly have had cause to disagree with the following statement:

"Therefore, as this order was most profitable and without doubt had proceeded from God the Holy Spirit (who giveth all good gifts), thus it also became accepted and received all over Christendom, and hath remained thus ever since, and must similarly remain as long as the world endures."

It is interesting to find that Laud recognizes the existence of episcopacy not only in Sweden, where the name of the office was officially retained, but also in those Lutheran Churches where the Latin equivalent "superintendent" was used. The question of the unbroken "tactual" succession seems not to have interested him. And Thorndike "would have desired the Reformed Continental Churches to have created an episcopal government for themselves, if they could not receive it from popish bishops." One could have wished that Professor Sykes had paid a little more attention to the question how far the idea of Apostolic Succession, as being solely transmitted by the laying on of hands in ordination, was considered important in the pre-tractarian Church. Neither does the author touch on the question of the threefold ministry and the possible variety of opinions regarding the order of deacons as more or less necessary for the *bene esse* of the Church. There seems to be room for further study there.

It was a favourite idea of the Tractarians that on essential points of order as well as on faith the undivided Church of the first centuries and the Caroline divines spoke with one voice. This was held to be the case not least with regard to episcopacy. That the theory of the Apostolical Succession as the necessary requirement for the validity of the ministry was not formulated with the same rigidity by all the leaders of the Oxford Movement, I have tried to show in my book *The Anglican Revival*. This theory was not the result of an impartial historical inquiry; it was a stronghold which seemed to offer safety against the real or imagined attacks of contemporary liberalism. The attempts to prove it from history were secondary. That the Tractarians were mistaken must now be admitted by all serious students of history. Professor Sykes' essay is a useful summary of the evidence, but its conclusions are no unexpected discoveries. If Bishop Henson had lived to

read it, he would have found in it the corroboration of assertions that he had often repeated—an unanswerable vindication of the Anglicanism which he used to say had never had its proper chance.

Of course, it is possible to assert that it was a happy mistake, that the Caroline divines were wrong and the Tractarians were right, and that this *felix error* has brought to light at last the only true Catholicism, which all Christians ought to embrace. That learned and revered expositor of Tractarian orthodoxy, Dr Darwell Stone, does seem to express an opinion which attaches a providential character to the Tractarians' mistake. It is necessary to concede however that the Tractarian and Anglo-Catholic way of looking at these questions represents a new departure in Anglicanism. Professor Sykes maintains that it is in the "combination of a primitive affirmation of the value of episcopacy and of the refusal to assert for it an exclusive claim that the *differentia* of the Anglican tradition consists."

The official attitude of the Church of England in recent times has however been largely governed by the Tractarian principles. This Church has in many ways inspired the movement for Church unity, but it has on the other side been an obstacle to the symbolic realization of that unity by at least occasional intercommunion. Thus, in the international youth conference held at Oslo last summer the Anglican members of it did not feel free to participate in the common Eucharist with their Reformed and Lutheran brethren. It remains to be seen whether the leaders of the Church, in view of recent research, are willing to reconsider this attitude.

Yngve Brilioth.
Bishop of Växjö, Sweden.

The Elements of Moral Theology. By R. C. Mortimer. A. and C. Black. 10s. 6d.

In this book Canon Mortimer has given us an outline of the traditional teaching on moral theology within the framework of Anglican conditions. In some details he is, perhaps, somewhat unfortunate; as in his probabilist treatment of the fast before Communion, which could well have been omitted; but, on the whole, the outline is a good one. Except for the really valuable works of Prummer and Merkelbach the author has eschewed the manuals and gone back to St Thomas Aquinas, than whom there can be no better foundation, and it is to be hoped that his book will lead some at least of his readers to a study of the Angelical Doctor.

Canon Mortimer tells us that, in writing this book, he has had two purposes in view: (1) "to provide a simple introduction to moral theology and to familarize Anglican readers with some of its methods and technical terms;" and (2) "to afford a starting point, if only of disagreement, for the complication of an Anglican manual." Both of these purposes are valuable, but they are not on the same plane; the first is intended to inform the ignorant and the second to aid experts. In this book, the second aim largely overshadows the first; nevertheless, the first is the more important and the one which the reviewer has chiefly in mind.

For the beginner, this book is not nearly simple enough, nor is it sufficiently co-ordinated with ordinary human life, especially in the chapters on human action, the morality of actions and conscience. Here we have so much theory as to bewilder the reader and cause him to wonder whether moral theology is really concerned with live men and women at all.

Further, in some cases the author, having enunciated a principle, proceeds to make so many reservations in regard to it, that the reader becomes befogged. For instance, Invincible Ignorance is excellently defined on page 40, but by the time one reaches page 80, one is rather driven to the conclusion that there is no such thing. (Incidentally, it is surely temerarious, in these days, to base an argument on the Thomistic principle that " the ordinary rules of morality are so plain and easily learned that one can only be ignorant of them wilfully or by gross negligence.")

In the same connexion one discovers a tendency to impose conditions impossible to the ordinary person. We are told that "the easy suppression of a doubt by reference to the practice of many contemporaries, and refusal to enquire further, is evidence of moral levity. If, on the other hand, anxious enquiry followed, books were read, due care and attention was given to the opinions of authoritative persons, due respect was paid to traditional Christian teaching, and a certain, though wrong conclusion finally reached, then the ignorance may be judged invincible." Surely this is rather much to expect from a factory hand or a farm worker, especially when, after all this labour, his ignorance may turn out to be vincible after all!

Canon Mortimer most wisely bases his teaching on that of St Thomas, but he does not always make Thomistic terms clear; this is particularly noticeable in his treatment of conscience and synderesis. Synderesis is reduced to a mere "awareness" and is said to be a "faculty" (though, as such, it would appear to be superfluous), while conscience is an "act." St Thomas, however, defined synderesis not as a faculty but as a habit, a potency of which conscience is the act. Such theorizing is only intelligible as an application of the general principle of potency and act which is neither explained nor alluded to, but of which most readers of this book may be assumed to be ignorant.

On whatever principle it is constructed one would expect to find, in a work on this subject, a chapter on sin, defining the kinds of sin and the capital sins, especially as it is with sin that the confessor is primarily concerned; but there is no such thing here. There is a distinction drawn between formal and material sin, venial sin is not mentioned, mortal sin, having been alluded to without explanation on page 82, is given a bare definition in another context on page 108 (there is no reference to it in the Index). The only capital sin to be treated at length is sensuality (seventeen pages), gluttony has two pages, pride is alluded to as a sin against magnanimity, and the rest do not appear at all, except by way of occasional illustration. It is true that the detailed treatment of sin is part of ascetical theology, but adequate definitions at least are a necessary part of the subject of this book.

It may be remarked, in conclusion, that a book of this kind is

required for reference, as well as for straight reading. It would have added considerably to the convenience of the reader if the author had provided, instead of a bare list of chapter headings, a detailed list of contents with full sub-headings, similar to that prefixed by the Bishop of Oxford to his *Principles of Moral Theology*.

F. P. HARTON.

BAULKING.

CONFLICT IN CHRISTOLOGY: A Study of British and American Christology, from 1889 to 1914. By J. S. Lawton. S.P.C.K. 20s.

The central theme of this book is that, during the period under review (considered to be pre-eminently the era of English-speaking "liberal theology"), there arose for Christological thought a crisis of the first order because, *at one and the same time*, two propositions claimed men's allegiance: that Jesus was a personal unity and that He was truly human. "The conjunction of the two axioms, unity and humanity, tended to heighten the tension between the divinity and humanity in Christ a thousand-fold" (p. 43).

How did this crisis arise? What were its results? What is the moral for contemporary theologians? These are the broad questions which the book considers, though it disclaims any intention to deal adequately with the third: "our purpose is historical and descriptive" (p. viii). We may summarize the main conclusions as follows:

(*a*) For the most part, the responsibility for the crisis is attributed to "science": not only to scientific method as influencing the concept of history, and so as having implications for biblical criticism; but also, in a more direct way, to psychology as offering a new theory of personality.

(*b*) The result is "conflict in Christology," and we may read of such various attempts to resolve the tension as are made in Kenotic theories (chap. 5) and in "solutions" described as "Theocentric" (chap. 10), "Anthropocentric" (chap. 11) and "Neo-Antiochene" (chap. 12).

(*c*) And what is the moral? There seem to emerge two suggestions: that Chalcedon far from being bankrupt provides us with our only doctrinal security; and secondly, that instead of beginning our Christology with concepts of man we should begin it with the idea of God.

What now have we to say by way of criticism?

(*a*) I find this section the least satisfactory part of the whole book. The influence of the scientific attitude on history and the bearing of both on biblical criticism need far more careful and critical an elucidation than we are given. What views of "science" and history lie, for example, behind the following assertions: The "reliability of historical events" has to "stand at the bar of inductive reasoning" (p. 2); the "science of history" is like the science of "physics" (p. 3)? What do we mean by saying of history that its "mode of approach, as its scope of operation" is very different from a natural science, while "the principles underlying its study" are the same (p. 3)?

Further, the philosophical implications of biological evolution and

historical development raise altogether different difficulties—unless we assume that the "scientific" methods of the exact and biological sciences are identical. But, if they are, scientific method seems then to be so vague a procedure as to mean no more than careful and close scrutiny, as, *e.g.*, in the metaphor: "every detail of the Bible was placed beneath the microscope" (p. 4).

Furthermore, all this is very different from the direct influence of *philosophical* psychology (hardly then "scientific" at all) on Christological doctrine.

Altogether, these questions, discussed in chapter 1 and mentioned later in other chapters (especially chapter 9), need a much more critical, detailed, and relevant treatment than they are given. Without such a treatment we may well feel that the significance of the Christological crisis has not been fully indicated.

(*b*) Much the best part of the book is the careful and well-documented summaries of the many and various representatives of Christological thought in the period. The treatment is so thorough and comprehensive as to bring into the limelight not only giants like Sanday, Gore and W. Temple, but back-numbers whom charity hesitates to mention, and who can thank Mr Lawton for altogether unexpectedly again occupying men's time and attention. The chapter on Kenotic theories is especially good.

(*c*) And what of the moral? Whatever he (or we) may think of the interrelations of science, history, philosophy and biblical criticism, the author is wise enough not to imagine that their problems will ever be irrelevant for Christological discussion. He is no *fanatic* of tradition. But I am not clear that he has given us any solid ground for hope that traditional doctrine will be found adequate, and in particular I would register a strong protest against the criticism that we cannot justifiably argue from "man to God." *How* can we argue from God to man? From where do we get our intelligible concepts of God if not by a *critical* and *philosophically justifiable* anthropomorphism? The alternative to this is hardly to proceed in the other direction: it is rather to give up the struggle to describe God at all, and to resign oneself to saying nothing whatever about him. Nor is the author altogether consistent: it is a mistake to begin with "nature, and with man" whence "the study would proceed upwards and outwards" (p. 17), but to deny anthropomorphic "emotions to God renders him scarcely recognisable to man as a Personal being," (p. 63), and "human psychological processes are at least in some sense analogous to the eternal omniscience of God" (p. 112). But in the last paragraph of the book the author reasserts quite clearly that he considers it a blunder to start Christological thought from a concept of man.

Time and time again we can see the importance of Will in Christologies both ancient and modern. I wish that the author had taken that emphasis further. I see no reason why, taking Will as fundamental (as, *e.g.*, Temple in *Foundations*), but on an entirely different epistemology and metaphysics, we might not arrive at a concept of the divinity of Christ which would preserve both His humanity and personal unity, and resolve the crisis.

The book is weakest in its earlier chapters. Chapter 1 is altogether inadequate to its topic, and chapter 3 is very tedious. A much more critical and concise handling of texts is needed, and one which illustrates more succinctly their doctrinal implications. But let me not appear ungrateful. It was no inconsiderable feat to produce a book of this kind (which gained for its author an Oxford B.D.) under severe personal handicap and so early in a ministry. It encourages the reader with hopes for the future.

I. T. Ramsey.

Christ's College,
Cambridge.

The Fourth Gospel. By Sir Edwyn Hoskyns. Edited by Francis Noel Davey. New and Revised Edition. Faber and Faber. 35s.

This posthumous commentary was first published in 1940 in two volumes occupying 718 pages. It now appears, more conveniently but less attractively, unabridged in one volume of 604 pages with a few minor corrections. After seven years the merits of Hoskyns as a commentator on the Fourth Gospel stand clearly revealed, and may perhaps be summarized as follows:

(i) He treats the Fourth Gospel not as a somewhat awkward intruder into the New Testament—a product of Greek speculative thought alien to the genius of primitive Christianity—but as the document which contains the clue to the understanding not only of the three other Gospels but of the Scriptures as a whole.

(ii) He shows that the historical problem of the Fourth Gospel, of which the modern reader has been so acutely conscious, is not confined to that Gospel, but is raised also by the other three. All the Gospels are, in fact, theological in character and must be interpreted as such: and, while all of them insist upon the historical character of the revelation made in the life and death of Jesus, none of them is concerned primarily with an objective or impartial presentation of that history. Fundamentally, *Mark* and *John* are saying the same thing.

(iii) He stresses more than modern commentators have generally done the significance to the evangelist of the death of Jesus. The Incarnate Word is the Divine Redeemer; and again and again the Passion of Jesus (and the purification effected by it together with the life-giving spirit released by it) is shown to contain the key to the understanding of the narratives which precede it.

(iv) He interprets the text as it stands in the manuscripts without indulging in any of the suggested rearrangements, which have been congenial to modern commentators, and which only too often have made confusion worse confounded. When the main themes of the Gospel are understood the need for such rearrangements vanishes.

(v) His work is essentially the result of first-hand and patient study of biblical dictionaries and concordances, and in consequence his exegesis always remains within the bounds of a biblical setting. While fully aware of what ancient and modern commentators have said, his commentary is very far from being an assortment taken from all and sundry.

(vi) He never allows the reader to forget that the words of the Gospel contain the revelation of the Word of God who through them is uttering God's final word of salvation and judgment.

A careful study of this commentary is indeed an education in biblical theology: but the would-be student should be warned that he will have to bring much patience to his task. Hoskyns' style is by no means always lucid; and sometimes his thought struggles desperately to find clear expression. Because of this I had myself hoped that, in the event of a one-volume edition being contemplated, it might have been possible to issue the work in a shorter form, by eliminating some of the more fanciful exegesis and by rewriting and abbreviating passages where the obscurity is most pronounced. Such an edition would have undoubtedly made the work more acceptable to many who at present will fight shy of it. Mr Davey has, however, too humble a conception of his function as editor and too great a reverence for his master to allow himself to lay hands in this fashion on his work. It must therefore be left to those very important people, the theological "middlemen," who stand between the technical scholars and those who are doing the front-line work of teaching, to pass on as best they can some of the treasures of this great book.

R. V. G. Tasker.

King's College,
London.

God's Action within the Soul. By F. H. Allen. S.C.M. Press. 6s.

This is an interesting and thoughtful book on the greatest of all themes. The author attempts to deal with the problem of Grace by establishing two propositions: (1) God acts not only towards but also within the soul; (2) in so doing God never uses "compulsion."

He recognizes that the recent emphasis on man's "confrontation" by God is valuable and necessary, but he insists that a belief in God as Creator with moral purposes leads directly to a belief that God must also be thought of as working directly at times within human souls.

The weakness of the book lies in his treatment of two presuppositions, viz., that *Absolutism* is completely false and that God does not coerce. In both these arguments there is metaphysical ambiguity.

It would have helped if attention had been given to the basic principle of analogy in applying distinctions of the space-time world to God. If we are going to think spatially about God's revelation to the soul we must beware of thinking of the infinite and eternal God as just one term in a manifold complex of points in space. The use of the conceptions of personal relations is likely to take us further with the old problem of God's transcendence and immanence. The main Christian tradition is based on the ideas of God as Unconditioned and Absolute and the doctrine of Creation prevents a descent into Pantheism; but our author hardly does justice to "Absolutism"; he confuses Dr C. C. J. Webb's "All-comprehending Reality" with the view that God is just "the sum total of existing finite things"; then, in justly objecting to this

view, he goes on to say: "God is not the sum total of existing things: He *is one component in that total*, though that to which all the others owe their existence." This goes very near to making God finite. We cannot be fair to Absolutism until we are clear that unconditioned and conditioned existence are divergent conceptions. His second presupposition about *Freedom* is inadequately explained. Freedom of choice between two alternatives is far from being the highest exhibition of freedom. It is true that the author recognizes that a moral character can give rise to actions and as such can have praise and blame attached to it; but he seems to feel that "choice between alternatives" gives us the essential picture of freedom; but if that were true God's freedom must be so described, for it is God's freedom in Himself and in Creation which gives us our basic standard. Yet if God's freedom is regarded as liberty of indifference the citadel of theism has been surrendered. On p. 64 statements are made which imply that God uses means to obtain the fulfilment of ends just as finite creatures do. Freedom and necessity must be united in God; this is why it is very doubtful if the statement that God never uses "compulsion" should be allowed to pass. Creation of the world is not self-chosen by creatures; does not God use compulsion when we are called away from this world of space and time? What of the idea of Judgment? Is not there an element of inevitability in the character of a saint producing holiness of life? (*i.e.*, given the character the deeds follow).

Apart from these metaphysical ambiguities, the book is most interesting, clearly written and valuable; his criticism of Dr Tennant's views is convincing; the chapter on the evidence of spiritual experience to the indwelling Spirit of God is excellent (one would wish to applaud the dictum on p. 54, "Personal responsibility and God's working within us go hand in hand"). The last two chapters on "God's Action within the soul and within the world" are the best in the book.

On the whole, the author does not take us further than Dr N. P. Williams in *The Grace of God* and Dr Hodgson in *The Grace of God in Faith and Philosophy*. But we are thankful for this book and hope it will be widely read, especially by any students who demand a false simplicity in any religion they propose to accept.

H. K. Archdall.

St David's College,
Lampeter.

Saadya Gaon. The Book of Doctrines and Beliefs. Abridged Edition translated from the Arabic. By Alexander Altmann. Oxford. 8s. 6d.

This volume is an exceedingly valuable contribution to the Philosophia Judaica of the East and West Library. Saadya was the creator of a Jewish philosophy of religion, and yet his *magnum opus*, the "Book of Doctrines and Beliefs," has so far not been accessible in an English rendering. Saadya was the most distinguished scholar of the Gaonic period of Judaism, which is usually dated from A.D. 589 to 1038. His Arabic translation of the Jewish Bible, still the standard Bible for Arabic-speaking Jews, would alone have been sufficient to place him in

the first rank of learning, not to mention his scientific excursions into the fields of grammar, philology, chronology, scriptural exegesis, synagogue liturgiology and Talmudic interpretation.

Second to none in importance, however, was his philosophical theology, represented by the present translation of a comprehensive selection from the "Book of Doctrines and Beliefs." Saadya lived in an age when "sects and schools sprang up in mushroom-like fashion," mainly through the renaissance of Islam, and his chief aim seems to have been to answer, as fully as possible, the problems which agitated the minds of his contemporaries, so that this work, as the translator says, is "a collection of living answers to living questions."

The treatise is of great interest as providing a link between Islamic theology on the one hand and Jewish and Christian thought on the other. The same problem of harmonizing faith and reason was encountered by the Muhammadan Mutazilites, the Jewish Saadya (and Maimonides), and also the Christian Aquinas.

In Islam the orthodox Ash'arians held it an impiety to submit the inscrutable ways of God to the limitations of human reason and clung to the literal interpretation of the Qur'an, whereas the Mutazilite *kalām* (speculative theology) endeavoured to harmonize faith and reason by applying the method of *ta'wīl* or allegorical interpretation to the Qur'an. Saadya, who was fully versed in Mutazilite theology, interpreted Judaism in the light of reason (*'aql*) after the fashion of the Mutazilite *kalām*. So far did he go in this direction that his problem was not so much whether revelation (faith) conformed to reason, but why revelation should have been needed at all, if the fundamentals of religion could be demonstrated purely by reason. His answer was that, reason being slow and difficult, revelation paved the way for the simple. We are reminded of Aquinas' *respondeo dicendum*, "it was necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would only be known by a few, and after a long time" (*Summa*, Pt. 1, Qu. 1, Art. 1.). But whereas for Saadya revelation is not essentially superior to reason, for Aquinas revelation is in a distinctly higher category from reason, for the natural light of human reason can err, but revelation derives its certitude from the light of divine knowledge which cannot be misled (Art. 3) and imparts truths, such as the doctrines of the Holy Trinity and Incarnation, which the unaided reason could never discover. Nevertheless, faith does not contradict reason and harmony prevails between them.

Saadya, however, introduces into philosophical theology the Rabbinic distinction of morality as discoverable by natural reason, and ritual as based on divine revelation only. Revelation, therefore, has the unique function of determining the *details* of the rational laws, while reason establishes the universal laws as such. This is presumably why orthodox Judaism today adheres firmly to what remains of her cultural ritual as against the Liberal school, for if Judaism is "only a question of a moral monotheism explained by reason, what remains of Judaism to constitute it a distinct religion?" (Vincent, *Judaism*, p. 83).

The chief subjects dealt with by Saadya are: Reason and Faith, Creatio ex nihilo, Attributes of God, Revelation, Providence and Free-

will, Reward and Punishment, the Soul, Resurrection, Redemption of Israel, and Life Everlasting—a rich fare, which calls for study in its historical setting. We owe a deep debt of gratitude to the translator for this rendering into English, and for his copious explanatory notes which link Saadya sometimes with his predecessors and sometimes with his successors.

F. Harold Smith.

Manchester.

Maurice to Temple. By Maurice B. Reckitt. Faber. 16s.

These Scott-Holland Memorial Lectures for 1946, whose sub-title is "A Century of the Social Movement in the Church of England," are the latest in the series which began with Professor R. H. Tawney's brilliant and path-breaking lectures, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism.* Mr Reckitt's lectures qualify for the first epithet if not the second. Like everything he writes, they are brilliant and witty in style and a pleasure to read (aided by the publishers, who have made amends for the dismal appearance of *Prospect for Christendom* by a beautiful example of book production, even though they do charge sixteen shillings for it). Sometimes, indeed, Mr Reckitt can be led astray by his facility for epigrams and pungent phrases—*e.g.*, on p. 45 we read: "The guilt of the church at this time did not lie in her refusal to throw herself heart and soul into the reform movements which were beginning after 1822 to challenge the moral, social and political stagnation of England, for in truth there was not much heart in them and no soul at all," a verdict which a moment's reflection will tell us is simply untrue. More often, however, his brilliance is not at the expense of his judgment. As to the second epithet, Mr Reckitt would not claim that they are path-breaking. They are a commentary on the theme of the sub-title. Indeed there is little that is new to those who know their Raven, Binyon and Wagner, and we fear that those who do not will find the allusiveness of the writing such that they get a very hazy idea of what was actually happening.

For the rest, much of the book is concerned with reflections on the social and economic history of the period, and the judgments lying behind them are of a rather conventional economic history "textbook" character. Where they deviate from the conventional they are open to suspicion. At different points in the book the following assumptions are made, all without examination: (i) that Marx has successfully shown that there are "inherent contradictions" in capitalism; (ii) that the monetary system causes acute under-consumption at home; (iii) that imperialism is therefore due to a desperate scramble for markets to keep the system going; (iv) that war is the natural outcome of industrial civilization. All these are at best dangerous half-truths which, since they can hardly be based on peculiarly *Christian* insight, show an inadequate technical mastery of the material.

This question of assumptions is important because it conditions the formulation of what are considered the significant questions, and hence the selection of material. Mr Reckitt details what he thinks are such questions on pp. 126 and 127 and on pp. 191 and 192. Some seem more

sound than others. In the last chapter there is a brief discussion of their bases, chiefly natural law and an "autochthonous" Christian sociology. However, Mr Reckitt is less explicitly (but rightly) influenced by an Incarnationalist theology, as his pre-occupation with the status of the worker as a "hand" shows: the man whom Christ came to save must not be treated in this way. Although the author does discuss his own views and those of his critics on the first two bases, he does not do it very fully and hence fails to do justice either to himself or to them. This chapter is very eirenically written and pleads for a united effort at constructive Christian leadership. But the awkward problem remains of what are the relevant questions to which to address ourselves. There are those who think that Mr Reckitt gets far more detail out of "natural law" than the concept will bear, and from Christian doctrine than he is entitled to, and that (in spite of wise words on p. 203 about the scope and limits of the humane sciences) he is led to ignore established facts and propound wrong questions. They will not have their apprehensions removed by this book. They will find that it enables him (i) to regard the whole socialist-capitalist issue as a side show and to treat socialism almost in terms of the "servile state"; (ii) in his account of recent years to be very selective in his references—*e.g.*, while COPEC is dealt with, the very important thought in the Œcumenical Movement on these subjects is ignored, whilst Malvern has a most undeserved prominence; (iii) the weakest part in Archbishop Temple's thought is singled out for most favourable mention, and his achievement in decisively breaking away from "social gospel" theology and showing that there are just the great Christian doctrines in the light of which each generation has to solve the problems of its own time, is passed over. (It will not do to subsume Dr Temple under the "Christendom" school.) (iv) There is nothing emerging which seems to be relevant to the problems this country is now facing. Mr Reckitt would say that it is because we see the problems wrongly and have fallen a prey to "secular idealism." But might it not be due to the fact that Mr Reckitt is working with a series of assumptions to which he has held for years and within which he is trying to fit a reality which won't go, and that they need drastic re-thinking?

For these various reasons we are compelled to regard *From Maurice to Temple* as a readable but disappointing book. Yet we shall remain grateful to the author for a long time for introducing us to G. K. Chesterton's verse on hearing Scott-Holland telling a Nottingham audience to rejoice in the Creation and say a thankful "I am":

> He said the human soul should be
> Ashamed of every sham,
> He said a man should constantly
> Ejaculate "I am."
> . . . When he had done I went outside
> And got into a tram.

Ronald Preston.

London.

PHILIP OF SPAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS. An Essay on Moral Judgments in History. By C. J. Cadoux. Lutterworth Press. 18s.

Since the publication of this work, Dr Cadoux's death has been announced and the book is so characteristic of the man that it is difficult to avoid writing a review which would have something of the quality of an obituary notice. For Dr Cadoux was a biblical scholar, a Liberal, a Modernist, and essentially a controversialist—and this book is characteristic of the man. This is no mere history of Spain and the Netherlands in the sixteenth century. More appropriate than its title is the sub-title, "An Essay on Moral Judgments in History." The author's purpose was to defend the right of the historian to make moral judgments upon the subjects of his study. In this book he proceeded to exercise to the full the prerogative he claimed, heartily judging, not only the chief protagonists of the revolt in the Netherlands, Philip II and William the Silent, but his fellow-historians—and their reviewers. It is easy to accept his contention that the historian cannot avoid bringing his own moral sense to bear upon his subject. One may even accept and respect his agreement with the late Dr G. G. Coulton that the most scientific historian could "content himself with Goethe's profession of faith, 'I can promise to be sincere but not to be impartial.' " He is charity itself with the historical characters he most disliked. But in judgments on their actions he falls into the error of failing to appreciate the truth of Mr Desmond MacCarthy's views, although he quotes them, that at the bar of history "the same cases are, so to speak, tried in different courts." For Dr Cadoux, it appears, there was only one valid standard by which the characters of history might be judged, that of the liberal-minded Protestant of the nineteenth century. The book, therefore, became an onslaught on recent Roman Catholic re-interpretations of history, in particular the history of the sixteenth century.

It is a pity that the manner of Dr Cadoux's presentation of his case spoils much of the effect that a bare recapitulation of the evidence in his favour might have produced. For there is no denying that a good deal of recent historical writing about Catholic Europe, and the period of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, has shown some lack of balance. Of the two writers with whom Dr Cadoux is chiefly concerned, Mr R. Trevor Davies's *The Golden Century of Spain 1501-1621* (London, 1937), while exceedingly valuable, is, to say the least, written from a point of view; while the second, Dr W. T. Walsh's *Philip II*, is not a serious historical writing. But he spoils a good case by a display of equally partisan judgment of another kind. In his condemnation of Catholic revaluations of history, he spared the time for an attack on *The Times Literary Supplement*. That this journal is under strong Catholic influences should be apparent to all—but not necessarily from the fact that on the December 4, 1936, it described the speech of a cardinal in conclave as "an example of perfect courtesy and charity." While to describe as biased the statement, in a review of *The Travels and Sufferings of Father Jean de Brébœuf*, that he was "one of the most heroic members of one of the most heroic bodies in the

history of the world, the Jesuit mission to the Hurons," seems very much like rejecting truth because of its propaganda value. Much the most damaging thing he is able to say about *The Times Literary Supplement* is that it published an apparently laudatory review of Dr Walsh's piece of pious nonsense. But it says little for Dr Cadoux's scholarship that he was able to describe the "divine right of kings" as "absolute and irresponsible authority" and as a "picturesque *medieval* illusion."

H. S. Deighton.

Pembroke College,
Oxford.

SHORTER NOTICES

Post-War Church Building. Edited by E. Short. Hollis and Carter. 30s.

A collection of articles by different writers, on the Building of a New Church, Church and Community, Planning a Post-War Church, Styles and Requirements, Acoustics, Glass, Bells, the Altar, the Anglican Tradition, Plate, Heating, Lighting, Woodwork and The English Church and its Surroundings.

Sir Charles Nicholson contributes three articles full of the results of his experience as a church builder: he does justice to the achievements of the nineteenth century. Mr Cachemaille-Day writes on Church and Community, almost entirely with the New-Estate-Parish-Communion Parish in mind. Mr Geoffrey Webb gives the rules for building and furnishing an altar according to the Roman Rite, which are probably new to many Anglicans. Each writer deals with his own subject more or less competently.

But nothing much emerges at the end. Most of what is in the book is generally known already: and there is very little to inspire enthusiasm or confidence about what may be done in the future. One or two abuses are condemned—*e.g.*, amplified gramophone records of bells, children's corners and imitation altars. But these things are constantly being put into churches. And many excellent nineteenth-century interiors have been spoiled in the last ten years by oak panelling and the wrong kind of lighting.

Some of the illustrations of twentieth-century work are very depressing—particularly the glass. If we cannot do better than that, why condemn and destroy Victorian windows?

The editor sees "a growing interest in the subject . . . which promises to make the best efforts of the church architects more profitable than at any time during the past four hundred years."

So in 1847 the *Ecclesiologist* was convinced "that the degeneracy of the last two centuries has at last come to an end," and hoped that an increase of faith and piety might soon adorn England with new churches not unworthy of comparison with Lincoln and York.

Basil F. L. Clarke.

Knowl Hill Vicarage,
Reading.

Life and Death in the Christian West. By Albert Gleizes. Dobson. 7s. 6d.

This book has a laudatory foreword by H. J. Massingham which speaketh volumes of what is to come: of doom, of renascence, of soil, toil and the yooping of intellectuals in home-spun sack-cloth.

This time, the author is a rusticating French artist, who writes in four essays of the whence and whither of civilization. Essay one deals with an alleged change in consciousness from life as exchange to life as exploitation. Essay two speaks up for the land and manual trades (had you guessed?). Essay three is about the mystery of bread and wine, denouncing the adulteration of the *res sacramenti*. Essay four concludes, "How many can be found who are ready to follow up words with deeds?" Well, let the galled jade wince, since our sympathies are with M. Gleizes and our ministerial endeavour is for those who flee to the fields. But there seems to be no prospect that our ideals will materialize in any predictable historical order without a series of terrible breakdowns. So we await apocalypse in fear and trembling. While we wait, there are in this book some pleasing obiter dicta to help us forget the cold in our belly, for our modern consciousness would so like something to turn up.

p. 35. "All the mechanical devices which surround us have only the appearance of utility: in practice it is we who have become their utility and their servants."

p. 49. "To advocate the modernization of the village as a means of keeping on the land those who have not quitted the countryside . . . illustrates the remote point of view of intellectuals who have severed all contact with reality and who imagine that by electrification . . . by rendering the pleasures of town life accessible . . . country youths will be induced to stay in their homes even though, at the same time, the primary school, democratic and state-controlled, intellectualizes them and adapts them to everything except life on the land."

p. 62. "For the moment it is intelligence alone that can bring about a return to the land: it is intelligence which will again take up the manual trades . . . (but) . . . the sensitive intellectual, who believes that change is coming, is nevertheless incapable of seeing that it will only be possible after a *renunciation* of the material things which encumber his environment."

p. 83. "The mechanization of the social body proceeds apace, each organ displaying a mad productivity from a wish to assert its independence."

p. 85. "Every nation organized itself industrially, everybody threw himself headlong into production for production's sake."

p. 90. "The direct result of the machine is the ruin of man because he cannot keep pace with it, his own powers of resistance in time and space being unable to accommodate themselves to the tempo of the mechanized world."

Plums indeed—but none ought to inflict upon friends the pudding of philosophical justification in which they are hid: save that for your enemies—M'sieu!

M. P. Ralph Bowman.

Ashbrittle.

BOOKS RECEIVED

(Mention here neither implies nor precludes subsequent comment.)

B.C.M.S.: W. S. Hooton and J. Stafford Wright, *The Bible Churchmen's Missionary Society (1933-47)* (7s. 6d).

Blackfriars: Martin Harrison, O.P., *The Everyday Catholic* (10s. 6d).

British Publishing Co.: Noel Harden, *Together Met* (8s. 6d.).

Burns Oates: F. H. Drinkwater, *Another Two Hundred Sermon Notes* (15s.); R. A. Knox, *The Book of Psalms in Latin and English* (12s. 6d.).

Cambridge University Press: Wilfred L. Knox, *The Acts of the Apostles* (8s. 6d.).

Church Book Room Press: C. Sydney Carter, *The English Church in the Eighteenth Century* (6s.); W. Wilson Cash, *The First Epistle of St. Peter* (6s.); W. H. Griffith Thomas, *Christianity is Christ* (6s.); Guy H. King, *All Through the Day* (5s.).

Church Historical Society, Philadelphia: Walter Herbert Stowe, *The Intellectual Revolution and the Anglican Communion* (25 cents).

Church Union: *Co-operation with Nonconformists* (9d.).

James Clarke: R. W. Stewart, *An Introduction to Jesus for the Twentieth Century* (6s.).

Cloister Press (Louisville, Ky.): J. W. Kennedy, *Advance into Light* (50 cents).

Dacre Press: L. A. Haselmayer, *Lambeth and Unity* (15s.).

East and West Library: Ernst Mueller, *A History of Jewish Mysticism* (8s. 6d.).

Faber and Faber: D. M. Baillie, *God was in Christ* (16s.).

Fellowship of Reconciliation: Lewis Maclachlan, *Defeat Triumphant* (5s.).

Gollancz: Walter Zander, *Is this the Way? A Call to Jews* (1s.).

Hodder and Stoughton: E. Stanley Jones, *The Way* (6s.).

Hollis and Carter: H. S. Shelton and Douglas Dewar, ed. by Arnold Lunn, *Is Evolution Proved?* (18s.).

Chr. Kaiser Verlag (Munich): Götz Harbsmeier, *Ihr werdet meine Zeugen sein!*; Karl Barth, *Die lebendige Gemeinde und die freie Gnade* (n.p.).

Kingsgate Press: G. W. Byrt, *John Clifford: A Fighting Free Churchman* (6s.).

Longmans: Mervyn Stockwood, *Whom They Pierced* (3s. 6d.); John P. Murphy, *The Size of Life* (7s. 6d.); Leslie Kingsbury, *The Way of Suffering* (6s.).

Lutterworth Press: L. E. Elliott-Binns, *Religion in the Victorian Era* (2nd edn.) (21s.); Paul Sevier Minear, *Eyes of Faith* (15s.); Denzil G. M. Patrick, *Pascal and Kierkegaard*, Vol. I (25s.), Vol. II (15s.); H. F. Wickings, *The Good News: The Story of Christ Jesus* (7s. 6d.).

Mowbrays: J. W. C. Wand, *The Spirit of Church History* (5s.); Bede Frost, *To the Hebrews* (6s. 6d.); Verney Johnstone, *The Anglican Way* (5s.).

Oxford University Press: Robert Bretall (Ed.), *A Kierkegaard Anthology* (30s.).

Philosophical Library, New York: Vergilius Ferm (Ed.), *Religion in the 20th Century* ($5.00).

S.C.M. Press: W. A. Visser 't Hooft, *The Kingship of Christ* (4s.); Elton Trueblood (Ed.), *Dr Johnson's Prayers* (6s.); E. Allison Peers, *Behind That Wall* (6s.); K. L. Carrick Smith, *The Church and the Churches* (7s. 6d.); J. E. L. Newbigin, *The Reunion of the Church* (10s. 6d.).

Sheldon Press: J. N. Comper, *Of the Atmosphere of a Church* (1s. 9d.); The Sisters of the Cross Melanesian Mission, *The Life of Our Lord Jesus Christ* (3s.).

S.P.C.K.: A Priest Doctor, *Christus Integritas* (2s. 6d.); Two Services for Plough Sunday (6d.); The Christendom Group, 1947, *Crisis and Reality* (4d.); Anthony Merryn, *Death of a Traitor* (3s.); T. A. Lacey, *Marriage in Church and State* (10s. 6d.); George Seaver, *The Beatitudes* (2s.); Lord Bridgeman, *The Country Parish* (1s.).

S.P.C.K. and National Society: J. Clifford Gill, *Christian Faith and Social Order* (1s.); Walter and Hugh Kendrick, *The New Testament for the Children—Book IV, The Beginning of the Church* (4s.).

Stevens: H. A. Smith, *The Crisis in the Law of Nations* (7s. 6d.).

Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht (Göttingen): H. Thielicke and H. Diem, *Die Schuld der Anderen;* H. J. Iwand, *Göttinger Predigt-Meditationen* (n.p.)

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